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Introduction1
This Discussion Paper argues that the initial mid-
1970s establishment of provincial governments 
as forms of decentralised authority has been mis-
understood. Anthony Regan, to cite one instance, 
has argued that there was intended to be ‘a radical 
redistribution of power, requiring the creation of 
new centres of power able to act as a counterbal-
ance to the central government as well as operate 
as new arenas for resolution of local tensions and 
disputes’ (1992:9). Instead, here it is argued that the 
principal determinant of the constitutional reforms 
was the continuing drive by indigenes to open up 
space in the postcolonial state so that their hold on 
political power could be transformed into commer-
cial opportunities. 
The ambitions and activities of sections of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie and would-be bourgeois 
were most important. One major consequence of 
the misunderstanding is that subsequent changes, 
including the 1995 and 2015 Organic Law reforms, 
continue to be examined primarily in terms of 
service delivery, successes and failures, and capac-
ity development (Haley and Wiltshire 2015). This 
limited focus continues to appear in descriptions 
of later moves to further decentralisation. These 
accounts produce little more than a breakdown 
of budgetary allocations and attempts to pinpoint 
political beneficiaries, including members of par-
liament (Wiltshire 2014), while official aid con-
centrates on what is termed capacity development 
(DFAT 2011).
Accordingly, a ‘shopping-list’ of various expla-
nations for the ‘unsatisfactory’ service delivery 
informs official policy prescriptions. To cite just 
one instance of this direction, a 2011 ‘Project 
Design Document’ lists the following reasons for 
‘unsatisfactory’ service delivery:
(S)ector specific policy and operational chal-
lenges, cross-cutting issues related to weak-
nesses in public administration and govern-
ance such as public financial management, 
policy coordination and coherence, and 
human resources management, issues to do 
with politics, power and leadership, funding, 
as well as logistical and technical issues. The 
GoPNG [Government of Papua New Guinea], 
together with development partner assistance, 
has been working to address these multiple 
constraints to service delivery. (DFAT 2011:5)
Soon after the establishment of provincial gov-
ernments in the mid- to late 1970s, there were criti-
cal accounts that examined whether these institu-
tions acted as counters to highly centralised authori-
ty and a desire to encourage local political participa-
tion, power to the people (cf. Ballard 1981; Standish 
1983). However, then and now, examinations of 
the political economy of decentralisation continue 
to avoid the central questions of what independ-
ence and subsequent reforms to the nation-state 
have constituted in terms of changes in class and 
state power. Against the proposition that decen-
tralisation produced ‘new centres of power’ which 
acted against central authority here it is argued 
that decentralisation resulted in the creation of an 
enlarged space at the centre of the national state. 
Decentralisation was part of changes underway 
at independence, providing opportunities for politi-
cal and state power to be joined and enhance accu-
mulation already in train in the capitalist colonial 
political economy. That is, decentralisation enlarged 
the field of central authority which was subsequent-
ly occupied by representatives of 
the local bourgeois and would-be 
bourgeois. The intensely political 
struggles which took place over the 
forms decentralisation was to take 
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stressed the importance of state power for the class’s 
advance. The importance was especially prominent 
in the case of the East New Britain and Bougainville 
bourgeoisie, as shown below, and of varying signifi-
cance for sections of the indigenous capitalist class 
from other parts of the country. Any assessment of 
the subsequent outcomes of decentralisation which 
does not recognise this primary purpose and the 
continuing effect of the initial reconstruction of the 
postcolonial state is inevitably limited.
This paper begins with a brief consideration of 
the late colonial legacy in which centralised politi-
cal and state power was such a prominent feature. 
From the early 1950s at least, the Australian admin-
istration was designed in part as an opposition to 
demands for devolution of authority from Canberra 
to Port Moresby and from Port Moresby to dis-
trict centres. Centralised authority, far from being 
intended to secure expatriate control, had as its 
main objective marginalising bourgeois and would-
be bourgeois, of whatever racial, ethnic or other 
identities. The overriding colonial objective — of 
securing a scheme of smallholder production — 
required confining settlers and indigenous commer-
cial and political ambitions to the margins of state 
power. As has been documented at length, increased 
smallholder agriculture producing for immediate 
household consumption, local and international 
markets was successfully coordinated and super-
vised by the colonial administration. By independ-
ence smallholder production of the main export 
crops had either surpassed or was about to surpass 
plantation output. Contrary to much accepted wis-
dom the colonial administration did not favour 
large holdings over small or almost entirely ignore 
household production (Hughes 7/5/2003). Particu-
larly during the 1950s and early 1960s, development 
meant ‘securing village life’ through major increases 
in household production (cf. MacWilliam 1986, 
1988, 1992, 1998, 2005, 2013:85–90; Thompson and 
MacWilliam 1992:120–55; Wright 1999, 2001, 2002, 
with Lea and Curtin 2011). 
The second and third parts of the paper illus-
trate through two instances, from a number which 
could have been chosen, how indigenous com-
mercial ambitions were expressed as demands for 
decentralisation during and immediately after the 
mid-1970s transition to self-government, then 
independence. The move into the commercial 
cockpit of Port Moresby by Highlands and Islands 
politicians/businessmen and the departure of Euro-
pean plantation owners respectively fuelled other 
demands for decentralisation (Ballard 1981; McKil-
lop 1982; Mel 1982; Standish 1982). However, none 
were as important for what occurred as the drive 
from East New Britain and Bougainville. Because of 
their relative importance for the forms decentralisa-
tion took, developments in these two districts are 
examined in some detail here. 
In the first case, that of the leading Tolai propo-
nents, their demands were pushed through specific 
commercial/political organisations that operated in 
East New Britain and Port Moresby. Where there 
was already a well-established and powerful Tolai 
bourgeoisie which held power, especially on the 
Gazelle Peninsula and in concert with the colonial 
administration, the next generation of would-be 
bourgeois dressed itself in radical attire, spout-
ing for a time anti-colonial, anti-European senti-
ments. Based around the Mataungan Association 
(MA) which was used to join their ambitions with 
the grievances of smallholders, landless and unem-
ployed, the key figures stood for and won national 
parliamentary office. One MA leader in particular, 
John Kaputin, had a major effect on pushing claims 
for decentralisation to the fore through his influ-
ential membership of the Constitutional Planning 
Commission (CPC). The commission’s final report 
placed the demand for decentralisation in the 
objectives of the independence constitution itself. 
However, the political adroitness of PNG’s first 
prime minister, (Sir) Michael Somare, and his allies 
succeeded in preventing the constitution from 
directly and immediately including devolution–
decentralisation provisions (Regan 1992:13–17). It 
was up to politicians who had been commercially 
insignificant previously in the Bougainville dis-
trict to play separatism to its political limits, short 
of secession, to force further reform. Advocates of 
decentralisation even prior to the first meeting of 
the CPC, the largely university-educated and com-
mercially ambitious indigenes had begun to force 
the construction of political space at the centre 
of PNG’s politics. Within ten years, the Bougain-
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ville bloc would become one of the leading edges 
of indigenous capital in PNG, with the flagship 
Bougainville Development Corporation probably 
the most substantial indigenous firm operating in 
a multiplicity of areas, including Port Moresby (cf. 
Ketan 2004:145). 
Origins and Purpose of Centralised Power
To understand the character of political and state 
power that advocates of decentralisation attacked 
as centralised and bureaucratic, it is necessary to 
go beyond the standard anti-colonial claims. These 
invariably assert that colonialism in general and 
Australian colonialism in particular is and was nec-
essarily authoritarian, dependent upon suppressing 
the indigenous population. Rule by administrative 
fiat was required when no popular legitimacy was 
available. In order to rule, authority had to be con-
centrated and centralised in the colonial adminis-
tration, itself constructed in a highly bureaucratic 
manner.
As much as there may be merit in such general 
propositions, they do not explain why particular 
colonialisms take specific forms. Post-World War II 
Papua New Guinea was a country where the exter-
nal authority of capital determined human behav-
iour, including that of the Australian administration. 
Bringing development meant bringing capitalist 
development in particular forms. As is extensively 
documented (see above), the principal form that 
increasing production and trade took was through 
smallholder expansion of produce for immediate 
consumption, local and international markets. So 
successful was this direction that by the early 1960s, 
coffee — rapidly becoming a major export — was 
dominated by household producers. Soon after inde-
pendence this dominance had extended to copra and 
cocoa, with plantation output less and less important 
(see Thompson and MacWilliam 1992, Ch. 4 esp.  
pp. 126–29; cf. Lea and Curtin 2011, Ch. 10).
To advance the scheme of smallholder produc-
tion, the colonial administration had to limit other 
possible forms of capitalist production, particularly 
where large holdings were utilised. Whether these 
were owned by international firms, expatriate owner-
occupiers or indigenes the barriers to any major, fur-
ther expansion of plantations employing wage labour 
had to be maintained. In order to effect such a 
policy European settlers and ‘native capitalists’ were 
marginalised politically (MacWilliam 2013:90–93). 
Existing plantations continued to operate primar-
ily for instrumental, revenue purposes to provide 
extension and other services which coordinated and 
supervised smallholder production. Marginalising 
included rejecting the first demands for decentrali-
sation which aimed to give district commissioners 
greater authority to determine such matters as the 
allocation of land for large holdings. Since these 
demands arose at the same time Territories minister 
Paul Hasluck was reining in the allocation of large 
holdings in the Highlands they could not be counte-
nanced (MacWilliam 2013:101–5).
The initial Legislative Council, established in 
1951, was dominated by administration person-
nel. The design was not, as some have suggested, 
driven primarily by either racial or bureaucratic 
motivations. The principal political purpose in hav-
ing the institution under firm ministerial authority 
was that Hasluck wanted to be able to closely watch 
and control deliberations, which were subject to his 
command. He sought to ensure that local officials 
were not ‘captured’ by local Europeans/expatriate 
Australians. The initial three nominated indigenous 
representatives were also sympathetic to and sup-
portive of colonial authority. Native local govern-
ment councils too remained under administration 
control as did cooperatives, processing and market-
ing organisations, including the Tolai Cocoa Project 
(TCP). During the 1950s and early 1960s checking 
indigenous accumulation and political power in any 
of these organisations remained a constant concern. 
The TCP case is instructive for several reasons. 
Large-scale planting of cacao/cocoa on the Gazelle 
Peninsula began after World War II under the con-
trol of Tolai large holders, including people who 
had previously learned about the crop while work-
ing on plantations. Then it was adopted through 
both spontaneous and intentional processes by 
smallholders. The explosion of growing from the 
early 1950s brought the colonial administration 
into active coordination and supervision of plant-
ing, processing and marketing. The TCP was a 
major attempt to centralise control of 18 local gov-
ernment council fermentaries, and the marketing of 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm4                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Scott MacWilliam
crop to exporters. From the outset, the administra-
tion-supported and supervised TCP contained the 
opposition between Tolai large holders and house-
hold cocoa producers. The effect of the containment 
became apparent when the project was privatised 
in the late 1960s. Privatisation and the attempts by 
younger Tolai politicians/businessmen to move into 
copra and cocoa production and marketing became 
an important feature of the anti-colonial drive that 
fuelled decentralisation demands on the peninsula 
(see below).
By the mid-1960s the manner in which colo-
nial authority was exercised began to be reformed. 
The previous indigenous ruling class had comprised 
chiefs and others with authority dependent upon 
heredity and acquisition, the so-called Big Men. The 
transition to a new indigenous capitalist class, driven 
by accumulation rather than acquisition (cf. Gregory 
1982:51; Martin 2015:186–204; Thompson and 
MacWilliam 1992:85–119), saw the ‘Big Men’ dis-
placed at the centre of state power by representatives 
of the younger, intensely ambitious bourgeois and 
would-be bourgeois (MacWilliam 2013, Chs 5–6). 
Late-colonial institutions were altered to contain the 
transfer of authority among indigenes. For an impor-
tant period, district councils and other forms of local 
government partly corralled the politically ambitious 
at the margins of state power where the colonial 
administration also still wielded overall authority. 
As the House of Assembly was reformed, mov-
ing from a majority of elected members in 1964 to 
an entirely elected chamber four years later, indige-
nous politicians were kept focused on local concerns 
by a universal franchise that made rural smallhold-
ers the overwhelming majority of voters. Politics 
remained local, and parties mostly parochial. At the 
same time the connection between individual com-
mercial ambitions and holding political power at the 
centre strengthened as well as became more appar-
ent. There was a noticeable shift in the occupations 
and other credentials of candidates for the 1968 and 
1972 House of Assembly elections with formal edu-
cation and commercial activities displacing earlier 
‘traditional’ criteria (Hegarty 1972, 1973).
The most astute and ambitious of the indig-
enous bourgeois and would-be bourgeois recognised 
the limited political space at the centre of the colo-
nial state for their advance and began to campaign 
for this to be enlarged. One important means by 
which enlarging took place was through the move-
ment of Papua New Guineans in state employment 
to occupy more and more of the higher-paid wage 
and salaried positions: soon after independence 
nearly all the most senior positions in the national 
administration were occupied by indigenes. Decen-
tralisation and the formation of provincial govern-
ments subsequently meant a further increase in the 
availability of senior and junior positions within the 
national and local administrations, even as critics 
objected to the cost.
The increased occupation of state positions, 
especially of the higher echelons of the administra-
tion, coincided with the removal of an important 
restriction on indigenous commercial advance 
which was a feature of the colonial administration. 
Until the mid-1960s, public officials were barred 
from straddling between state employment and pri-
vate commerce: in the Highlands George Greathead 
and Ian Downs, owner-occupiers of large holdings 
planted to coffee, had to resign from state employ-
ment. However, as independence approached and 
demands for localisation of state positions and pri-
vate enterprises became constant, the restrictions 
on straddling were lifted. Enlarging the adminis-
tration and expanding the state, and increasing the 
number of senior higher-waged and salaried posi-
tions became critical for indigenous accumulation 
and acquisition as government officials also became 
businessmen and women.
In urban Port Moresby, joint ventures between 
expatriates and indigenes in state employment pro-
vided an early example of the effect removing the 
restriction would have on the formation of indig-
enous capital (Andrews 1975). In rural PNG, the 
departure of expatriate plantation owners wanting 
to quit large holdings as going concerns provided 
further opportunities for indigenes. The connection 
between economic advance and political power was 
emphasised when Development Bank and other 
finance was needed to buy out previously expatri-
ate-owned plantations (MacWilliam 1986; Ketan 
2004, esp. Ch. 4).
If Hasluck was generally concerned to margin-
alise the European planters and native capitalists, he 
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also had a more precise focus on which indigenes 
should be kept out of power. Early on, he identified 
the ‘smart boys and shrewd heads’ of Port Moresby 
and Rabaul as targets for exclusion.2 However, once 
he left office, and amidst the increased commercial 
and educational opportunities of the 1960s, such 
regional identities were to an extent surmounted in 
that part of nationalist politics which had an urban 
focus. Organisations based in Port Moresby, includ-
ing the Bully Beef Club, precursor to the Pangu 
Pati, attempted to be less parochial even when, 
as noted above, the structure of electoral politics 
remained rural and local. 
Nationalism and the Politics of State Power
The Gazelle Peninsula and the Mataungan 
Association
During the transition to self-government and 
independence, localism combined political and 
commercial ambitions in what were described as 
‘micronationalist societies’. As James Griffin, Hank 
Nelson and Stewart Firth (1979:149) explained:
Generally these micronationalist societies felt 
that the Administration, the missions, expa-
triate entrepreneurs and councils had failed 
to advance their economic interests and that 
more direct assertion, both political and eco-
nomic, was necessary. An appeal was made to 
tradition to provide legitimacy and there was 
a revival or revision of communal rituals.
A central driver of localist as well as national 
politics was the shortage of fertile land to provide 
for either further smallholder expansion or the 
agricultural ambitions of bourgeois and would-be 
bourgeois. Land ownership — and thus the form in 
which labour would be engaged to make acreages 
productive — as well as other forms of commercial 
advance were at the centre of what were also termed 
‘micro-nationalist movements’ during the transition 
to self-government and independence (May 1982a). 
Since the administration of land ownership and the 
ability to secure transfers lay with a national depart-
ment subject to central political power, localism was 
integral to nationalism and the reconstruction of the 
national state (Fingleton 1981). 
During the colonial period, plantations had 
been established mainly in the Highlands, Eastern 
and Western, and the Islands region. Where these 
remained owned and operated by either interna-
tional firms or expatriate owner-occupiers demands 
for their transfer to indigenous ownership intensi-
fied. Whether the transfers would mean retention 
as large holdings or break up into smallholdings 
became an intensely political battle. The tussles 
resulted in land legislation passed during the self-
government period that preserved the private prop-
erty form, limiting either squatter occupation or 
compulsory acquisition. The importance of holding 
central political power was also reinforced by this 
and other legislation. ‘Micro-nationalism’ was nec-
essarily a form of ‘macro-nationalism’: exercising 
popular authority locally had to be confirmed by 
national institutions which controlled the transfer 
of land ownership, issued currency, provided loans 
and generally determined the conditions which 
underpinned financial flows.
The central control of land legislation was to 
have an important effect on Highlands politics in 
the move to independence. Along with an outburst 
of tribal fighting, driven largely by shortages of fer-
tile land for smallholders (GoPNG 1973), the pre-
independence period was characterised by expatri-
ate settler enthusiasm for the sale of their coffee 
plantations as large holdings. The construction of 
development corporations, financed by the Devel-
opment Bank and private financial institutions, 
mediated the European settler, indigenous bour-
geois and smallholder demands. Large holdings 
were purchased by these corporations, with indig-
enous capitalists and smallholders as shareholders, 
and validated nationally. With many plantations 
transferred at inflated prices during the coffee price 
boom of 1976–77, indebtedness — and thus little if 
any dividends to shareholders — soon turned the 
large holdings into sites of local struggle between 
accumulation and welfare. By the mid-1980s, as the 
takeover of expatriate-owned large holdings was 
completed, most plantations were under pressure 
for the return of land into smallholding occupa-
tion. Indigenous capital in the Highlands operated 
more successfully in associated activities, including 
transportation, processing and marketing, within 
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the region and by moving into major urban centres, 
including Port Moresby. Decentralisation had a 
limited purpose and effect in the Highlands region 
when land legislation was of contested importance 
on many large holdings.
Instead, the significance of joining local politi-
cal authority with a hold on the central government 
was of greater importance on the Gazelle Peninsula 
where by February 1969 demands for Tolai inter-
nal self-government were being pushed. Here an 
established Tolai bourgeoisie had been previously 
dominant in indigenous politics and commerce 
(Grosart and McColl 1976). Their role in the initial 
development of cocoa production has been noted 
above. This powerful Tolai commercial position had 
been achieved largely through institutions coordi-
nated and supervised by the colonial administration 
(Epstein 1968). In order to supplant the prior Tolai 
position, younger Tolai with political and commer-
cial ambitions joined their drive with longstanding 
household grievances, especially over land. In 1969, 
the Mataungan Association with a membership 
entirely Tolai and a leadership decidedly more radi-
cal in its demands than were being pushed by the 
older Tolai was formed in Rabaul. The actions of the 
MA leadership affected all politics on the peninsula, 
especially with the 1972 elections approaching.
In the 1972 elections, anti-colonial nationalism 
coupled with generational radicalism secured elec-
toral success for the association’s three main lead-
ers, Oscar Tammur, who had been elected in 1968, 
John Kaputin and Damien Kereku. Each was from 
the younger educated ‘elite’. Kaputin had studied 
in Port Moresby, been a member of the nationalist 
Bully Beef Club and operated an unsuccessful busi-
ness venture (Grosart 1982:161) before returning 
to the Gazelle Peninsula where he became manager 
of the Gazelle League of Savings and Loan Socie-
ties. In the early 1970s, Kaputin was involved in the 
formation of the New Guinea Development Cor-
poration (NGDC) which raised share capital from 
Tolai, many of them smallholders. The NGDC was 
formed ostensibly to challenge the European and 
Chinese commercial dominance on the peninsula, 
and to capture dissatisfaction with the process by 
which the Tolai Cocoa Project was being privatised. 
The NGDC ‘establish[ed] a market (in competition 
with the Rabaul Council’s market), and [acquired] 
interests in plantations, cocoa and copra marketing, 
trade stores and a tavern’ (May 1982b:14–15). 
It is not possible here to document the history 
of the NGDC whose operations became the sub-
ject of Registrar of Companies’ investigations and 
legal proceedings. However, a brief illustration of 
how the Mataungan Association’s leadership walked 
‘both sides of the street’ can be provided. Some hint 
of the association’s ambiguity towards indigenous 
nationalism was apparent from the outset, even as 
it became significant in the drive for decentralisa-
tion. As Grosart also pointed out (1982:154): ‘The 
Mataungan Association was and is radical because 
it wants decisions to be made by Tolai people, but 
this may or may not mean the Tolai people’, and 
(1982:160): ‘Like the Melanesian Way, Mataungan-
ism was an open-ended idea, seemingly available to 
self-interested entrepreneurs’. 
That the nationalism and the objective of 
establishing a national state with more space at the 
centre for local demands was bourgeois in character 
can be easily seen. The commercial operations of 
the NGDC were just one instance of the position 
being taken by the association’s leadership. Another, 
equally telling, can be understood through the 
following May 1973 statement of Leon Bridgland, 
the Burns, Philp plantation division manager. Based 
in Rabaul, Bridgland was trying to cut a deal with 
the national government so the major trading 
and agricultural firm could hold on to its most 
productive and profitable plantation acreages while 
satisfying demands that it hand back unplanted 
and under-utilised land for redistribution to 
smallholders. He wrote to the Burns, Philp head 
office in Sydney that:
The general outlook up here looks much 
better than it did a couple of years ago. All 
very friendly and situation very quiet from 
a European point of view. Matanguans 
[sic] have become a reformed capitalist 
organisation, and have been of great assis-
tance to me in settling land disputes. Somare 
and Co. performing quite responsibly in 
difficult political times. (Bridgland, cited in 
MacWilliam 1987:19)
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In 1973, Kaputin was an important member 
of the Somare-led coalition that had surprisingly 
taken power after the previous year’s self-govern-
ment election. In August of that year, as a further 
demonstration of Kaputin’s personal flexibility 
and growing political importance he became Jus-
tice minister and subsequently a major radical 
nationalist figure in the Constitutional Planning 
Commission. The CPC presented its final report 
in August 1974 (GoPNG 1974). Two months later 
Kaputin was sacked as Justice minister (MacWil-
liam 2013:225–29). The CPC Report played a criti-
cal role in determining the political direction of 
the nation, including in strengthening state power 
so that separatist demands for the centre’s enlarge-
ment could be contained. PNG’s independence in 
September 1975 occurred under a unitary constitu-
tion, with the national state subsequently reformed 
through a 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Govern-
ment. The Somare government was confident of its 
position and strategically astute enough to appoint 
Oscar Tammur, MA official and National Assembly 
member for Kokopo Open, the minister for provin-
cial government. Tammur held office during some 
of the most intense struggles over how the central-
ised state could contain the even more separatist 
claims being made by an equally bourgeois Bou-
gainvillean leadership (see below).
After his sacking Kaputin remained in parlia-
ment with his MA colleagues, part of the governing 
alliance and able to continue to press for devolu-
tion of authority to the districts, later provinces. He 
also retained a measure of political power on the 
Gazelle Peninsula through the Mataungan Associa-
tion’s activities, which facilitated his retention of the 
Rabaul Open electorate at the next, 1977, national 
contest (Grosart 1982:170–75).
However, the most important centre of local 
power lay outside the grasp of the MA leadership 
and with the wealthier, older Tolai bourgeoisie, 
even as the former acquired national influence. 
While there had been substantial local opposition 
to the formation of the multiracial Gazelle Local 
Government Council, it was still incorporated and 
proclaimed in February 1969. This official move 
provided a focal point for the MA, which in early 
1971 began elections for its own local government 
council. The election crystallised the split within 
the Tolai leadership and their separate bands of fol-
lowers, at the same time as the tussles over decen-
tralisation intensified nationally. While by 1975 
preparations were underway for the establishment 
of an interim Tolai government with an important 
role for the first Tolai provincial commissioner, two 
things were already clear. 
The MA had reached the peak of its importance 
on the peninsula, both politically and commercially 
(Grosart 1982:168–75; Griffin et al. 1979:204–5). 
Although after independence the MA leadership 
retained a measure of success in holding elected 
office in the local government, a combination of 
council administrators and other non-MA political 
representatives held most power in the provincial 
assembly (Grosart 1982:168–75). Even the focus of 
MA commercial aspirations changed, as Kaputin 
became preoccupied with his Port Moresby business 
and national representative politics. Leadership in 
the cause of decentralisation had passed to an even 
more radical separatist movement on Bougainville: 
it is to this shift that the account now turns.
Bougainville and Separatism Played to its Limits
From the early 1960s at least, there had been con-
cerns expressed on Bougainville about whether the 
district should be included in a future PNG. Oppo-
sition to Australian colonial rule had led to a peti-
tion to the United Nations but received no impor-
tant international support. Instead indigenous capi-
tal had begun commercial advance through agricul-
ture and trade, while acquiring a measure of politi-
cal power in local government and cooperatives 
(MacWilliam 2005). The relatively higher standards 
of education in parts of the district ensured that 
Bougainvilleans would become prominent in the 
administration of the colony as many positions 
were indigenised. Others entered representative 
institutions as these too were reformed.
Paul Lapun was an especially prominent Bou-
gainvillean who became important nationally in 
the run-up to self-government. Typical of postwar 
indigenous accumulators Lapun was Roman Catho-
lic mission educated, attended a church seminary, 
left and became a mission teacher. Occupying a 
higher wage position, Lapun straddled between 
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teaching, cocoa farming for which he employed 
workers, and local politics. Although originally 
from Banoni, south-west Bougainville, Lapun’s 
influence spread rapidly, including into the Kieta 
area. In 1964 he was elected to the further reformed 
House of Assembly, and within two years became 
under-secretary for Forests. From this position he 
was able to push for a major renegotiation of the 
terms for the operation of the Panguna mine, the 
establishment of which was already causing consid-
erable local dissatisfaction. In 1966 he was success-
ful in changing mining policy, so that instead of a 
simple acreage fee for occupation plus compensa-
tion for damage done, landowners received 5 per 
cent of the 1.25 per cent mining royalties going to 
the administration. 
Dissatisfied with even this change, Lapun 
resigned from his official position and became dep-
uty leader of the newly formed Pangu Pati, headed 
by Somare. He also began to extend his influence 
in Bougainville politics, cultivating ties in other 
parts of the district and among the next genera-
tion of young radicals. The 1972 Assembly election 
probably marked the peak of his political power in 
the district, when his older ally Raphael Bele and 
his younger protégé Father John Momis also were 
elected to national seats. In blocking the attempt 
by young student radical Leo Hannett from even 
standing for election, Lapun showed the extent of 
his local authority. Subsequently, the defeat would 
spur even greater efforts by Hannett to lead the 
separatist cause on Bougainville (see below). How-
ever, bringing the committed nationalist Momis 
into the fold proved even more significant, especial-
ly when a Pangu and Somare-led coalition formed 
the government after the election. 
With Lapun as minister for Mines and Energy, 
Momis deputy speaker and then deputy, effec-
tively de facto chair of the CPC, and Donatus Mola 
member for North Bougainville and minister for 
Business Development, the district’s political-com-
mercial position in the new government seemed 
assured at an especially auspicious time. With rene-
gotiations over the mine to be conducted between 
the Australian Government, the mining company 
BCL (Bougainville Copper Limited) and the indi-
genised PNG Government the terms of the mine’s 
occupation and operations were settled in a highly 
centralised form (Garnaut 1981:193–97). Opposi-
tion from landowners and those with commercial 
ambitions intending to gain funding and commer-
cial space around the massive mine had necessarily 
to take a local form which forced space at the cen-
tre for their demands. This space required the con-
tinuity of legal title for BCL, the use of a national 
currency in which to conduct commercial trans-
actions and other political-legal conditions (e.g. 
export and import licences, labour permits, finan-
cial regulations) constructed nationally. 
If the protests against the establishment of the 
mine which were aired internationally as well as 
in PNG showed substantial landowner opposition 
(provoking a national police and other administra-
tive response), political–ideological opposition was 
also developing from a related direction. At the 
University of Papua New Guinea radical nation-
alism drove the formation of numerous student 
organisations, including among Bougainvilleans, 
with their leaders echoing international objections 
to colonialism, racism and ‘white’ Australian rule. 
Since the mid-1960s a group of students from the 
district attending Holy Trinity seminary in Madang 
began pushing for secession. Formed in 1968 the 
Mungkas Association with branches in Port Mores-
by, Lae, Goroka, Mt Hagen, Rabaul and Madang, as 
well as on Bougainville represented the urban edu-
cated opposition to developments. Hannett drew 
upon Brazilian educator and activist Paulo Freire, 
US Black Panther Stokely Carmichael, and ‘Father 
John Mormis [sic]’ among other sources for his 
influential essay (Hannett 1972; cf. Kaputin 1969). 
Lapun was ambivalent on secession and as circum-
stances demanded Hannett, a former Holy Trinity 
seminarian, was to swing wildly on the preferred 
direction. 
Further expansion of the land area needed for 
a townsite and port facilities to service the mine 
continued to fuel local concerns. Lapun failed in an 
attempt to have the House of Assembly direct the 
administrator to appoint a committee to tour Bou-
gainville and establish if a referendum on secession 
should be held among the district’s population. A 
political-business organisation Napidakoe Navitu, 
headed by an expatriate entrepreneur and initially 
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with close ties to Lapun, attained a measure of 
prominence alternately leading the calls for separa-
tism or secession. As the organisation which had had 
considerable influence began to fail commercially 
and politically, room was left for the Bougainville 
Special Political Committee (BSPC), set up in 1973 
by Hannett and others to reinvigorate the dissent.
Fortuitously, just as PNG approached independ-
ence, a major boom in international mineral prices 
made the Panguna mine even more profitable. With 
Lapun minister for Mines, international advice in 
the form of a World Bank–commissioned Faber 
Report urging increased government activities to 
stimulate indigenisation and smallholder agricul-
ture, and demands from Bougainville for more ben-
efits from the mining, renegotiation of the agree-
ment with BCL became imperative (Garnaut 1981). 
The outcome of the renegotiations was a major 
win for the new government. Not only did the reve-
nue flow increase substantially with more attention 
paid to the socioenvironmental effects of the mine, 
the manner in which the exercise was conducted 
greatly increased the confidence of indigenous 
politicians and government officials (Griffin et al. 
1979:189–90). One measure of the chief minister’s 
confidence was soon on display as the demands 
from Bougainville increased.
The operations of the mine on Bougainville 
were already giving a major boost to commerce and 
commercial aspirations in the district, at the same 
time as protests grew against BCL and the govern-
ment’s handling of these. In early 1973, Somare 
attempted to coopt the oppositional edge, which 
vacillated between demands for secession with less 
extreme claims. He appointed Hannett ‘this angry, 
table-thumping man as my special adviser on Bou-
gainvillean affairs’ (Griffin et al. 1979:212). In the 
next month Hannett gained the approval of the 
Bougainville Combined Local Government Coun-
cils to form a Bougainville Special Political Com-
mittee, which would subsequently provide him with 
a more powerful political base. As Griffin et al. 
(1979:212) concluded:
How ambivalent Hannett was about secession 
at this time is difficult to say as he often gave 
the impression that he was using it as a threat 
to gain the fullest autonomy for Bougainville 
within Papua New Guinea and as a vehicle 
for self-justification and future preferment. 
Certainly, he seemed unaware that threats of 
secession were a tactic which could blunt eas-
ily and that time was on Somare’s side rather 
than his own. 
Far more than time was on Somare’s side as would 
be revealed subsequently (see below). However, for 
the remainder of 1973 Hannett used both the for-
mation of the BSPC and his position in the Somare 
government to advance even stronger claims for 
revenue, including the right to collect tax and excise 
as well as decide how much should be remitted to 
the central government. Hannett attacked Lapun 
and Mola as Somare’s men, demanding they both 
be removed from current ministerial positions. 
Instead Somare sacked Hannett from the national 
post as special adviser which the latter turned into 
a new position as planning officer for the interim 
district government. While Hannett was temporar-
ily thwarted in his ambitions to be elected as pro-
vincial premier, the ‘Interim District Government 
set to with unusual zest to invest in local enterprises 
and services. Relations with the Mining Company 
were amicable; its expertise was available; its mul-
tiplier effects could be harnessed for development’ 
(Griffin et al. 1979:214). One such enterprise was 
the Bougainville Development Corporation, offi-
cially registered in 1975 to implement a business 
strategy framed the previous year (see below). 
During 1975 a political bloc led by Hannett 
ramped up pressure on the national government, 
using secessionism as a tactic to push separatism 
to its political limits. Each time the national gov-
ernment made concessions, such as by granting 
the provincial government the full 1.25 per cent 
of mining royalties, other demands — including 
for K150 million to set up a Bougainville govern-
ment — were made. On 1 September, with PNG’s 
independence date set as 16 September, a flag of 
the North Solomons Republic was raised at Arawa 
market while Hannett made a rousing if politically 
ambiguous speech. 
Unfortunately for the separatist strategists, 
another attempt to gain international support for 
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Bougainville self-government at the United Nations, 
led by Momis and John Teosin, was comprehensive-
ly rebuffed. The Australian flag was lowered and the 
new PNG flag raised at a major ceremony in Port 
Moresby. Well aware of the commercial aspirations 
which had been further inspired on Bougainville by 
the mine’s operations, Somare became prime min-
ister and indulged his favourite past-time, golf. As 
Griffin, Nelson and Firth conclude of Somare’s self-
confidence during what seemed to be an especially 
tense moment in the battle to keep PNG territorially 
and politically intact: ‘His view was that the bisnis-
minded Bougainvilleans would tire of this lack of 
development and of leaders who, without arms or 
direction, could not supply purposive action’ (Grif-
fin et al. 1979:217). 
However, as has been argued here, this was not 
a case of ‘(e)very Melanesian apparently (having) 
his price’ (Griffin et al. 1979:217). Separatism as 
played by the new, next layer of the Bougainville 
bourgeois and would-be bourgeois was to develop 
arenas of accumulation beyond those previously 
occupied in agriculture and trade by other Bou-
gainvillean commercial operations. That is, only 
particular Melanesians had their price and Somare 
read the direction of their ambitions well. The for-
mation of a provincial government as an integral 
component of the national state, which enlarged 
and extended the institutions of government to 
secure further arenas for indigenous accumulation 
did not weaken PNG but strengthened the national 
government’s capacity on behalf of capital in gen-
eral and particular capitals. This account now turns 
to the most prominent form the new commercial 
operations took on Bougainville to show an impor-
tant instance of the ties between decentralisation 
reform and commercial aspirations.
Bougainville Development Corporation 
The following is a brief summary of the firm’s 
formation and operations, from the mid-1970s 
until the 1988–89 revolt on Bougainville and at 
Panguna stopped its further growth (Thomp-
son and MacWilliam 1992:103–9; MacWilliam 
2013:235–36). Unlike in areas of the country where 
the bourgeoisie’s large-holding ambitions were con-
stantly under pressure from smallholders, as in the 
Highlands (see above), on Bougainville indigenous 
capital had a period of consolidation. Even prior 
to its registration in 1975, the firm’s key officials 
had developed a business plan with several stages 
of expansion. The provincial government and the 
local diocese of the Roman Catholic Church held 
75 per cent of the issued share capital, with the pro-
vincial government’s shares held in a royalty trust, 
indicating that the source of the funds was royalties 
from the mine.
Phase 1 of the commercial strategy was to own 
and operate service industries around the mine. 
These involved investing royalties from the mine’s 
operations to acquire a tourist resort frequented 
by highly paid and salaried mine employees, plus 
the ‘wet’, alcohol sales through licensed canteens at 
the mine. The outlets were very profitable during 
a phase of the mine’s construction and operations 
when many workers were single male migrants, 
without local ties. The firm also invested in an air-
line, which adopted a symbol of Bougainvillean 
identity for its planes. 
Tying together the political and commercial 
dimensions of the firm’s existence was the overlap 
between directors and the provincial government. 
From the 1975 inception of provincial government 
in Bougainville until 1984, Hannett was both chair-
man of the firm and provincial premier. During the 
early 1980s, Phase 2 of the 1974 plan involved using 
the established commercial base to move into plan-
tation agriculture, cocoa marketing and exporting. 
Phase 3 further emphasised the distinctiveness of 
the firm’s direction, to extend beyond Bougainville 
in shipping and manufacturing. The hold on the 
provincial government and royalties from the mine 
was critical to further advance, as were the political 
arrangements underpinned by national institutions. 
In the scope of their ambitions, the BDC leader-
ship sought to take indigenous commerce in PNG 
into a new, advanced phase which would also have 
required further changes to the national state if 
import substitution manufacturing was to become 
substantial.
Unfortunately for the commercial bloc that 
formed around BDC, the very reach of their ambi-
tions played a major part in bringing the firm 
undone and provoking the later revolt on Bougain-
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ville. Relying upon royalties as a source of finance, 
then privatising the ownership of BDC through 
changes in the composition of share ownership 
generated intense local opposition. Landowners 
who felt the consequences of royalties fuelling accu-
mulation rather than welfare payments turned their 
anger against BCL as well as against the Bougain-
ville bourgeoisie. BDC in particular lost much of its 
property in Arawa and nearby as the revolt inten-
sified and a new form of separatism, with a much 
more pronounced secessionist component, emerged 
over the course of a prolonged struggle. 
This struggle, with its overt attack on private 
property rights previously secured through PNG 
legislation and the national police and defence 
force, emphasised just how bourgeois nationalist 
the earlier separatism had been. The leadership of 
the 1988–89 revolt by mine workers, ex-military 
personnel, small landowners and their militias of 
largely unemployed young men with limited formal 
education served to further emphasise the distance 
between the content of the two forms of separatism. 
The latter wanted to weaken the national state while 
the former required it to be strengthened to sustain 
their drive for commercial expansion.
Conclusion
It would be a serious mistake to read into this Dis-
cussion Paper that the two cases discussed here, of 
separatism on the Gazelle Peninsula and Bougain-
ville, exhaust the examples which could be used for 
tying the initial establishment of provincial gov-
ernments to the ambitions of indigenous capital. 
Clearly, as the range of accounts of ‘micro-nation-
alism’ indicate, during the 1960s and early 1970s 
there were a range of conditions in which political 
demands were made for greater commercial sup-
port from the national government. However, as 
indicated but not examined during this paper, two 
features of these demands stand out in districts and 
sub-districts beyond the peninsula and Bougain-
ville. Firstly, the demands were not ‘anti-nationalist’ 
but for an extension of national authority, including 
through decentralisation. Where welfare concerns 
were raised, even in those cases where the initia-
tors were not simply being opportunist and instru-
mental, the demand was for the construction of 
institutions that depended upon the national state 
for funds and other resources. Thus the descrip-
tion ‘micro-nationalist’, that the national state be 
strengthened through the formation of provincial 
and other levels of authority to provide welfare 
measures is appropriate.
Secondly, the most important drivers of politi-
cal reform were not indigenes seeking improved 
welfare: most of those politically active and impor-
tant were seeking to join higher wage and salaried 
positions with commercial aspirations. Such activi-
ties were foremost for these ‘leaders’ who were 
either already or aspired to become bourgeois, 
owners of capital and employers of labour. As Grif-
fin et al. (1979:187) note, even during the politi-
cally difficult period prior to independence, Somare 
too ‘did not … neglect his own business interest in 
Wewak’. If a new layer of capital was in the process 
of formation as expatriates vacated plantations and 
other commercial enterprises, holding political and 
state power was central to this advance. When the 
colonial state had been constructed to a substantial 
extent to constrain both European and indigenous 
capital in key areas of the political economy, both 
forms of power had to be transformed to accom-
modate indigenous commercial ambitions and 
operations. Decentralisation, the supposed ‘redistri-
bution of power’ with the creation of ‘new centres’, 
was a major means by which the ‘new class’ extend-
ed its hold over the national state and population. 
Hopefully this paper will encourage others to 
examine the political economy of provincial gov-
ernments and other local level authorities with 
more attention to the importance of these institu-
tions in the development of capital, indigenous and 
otherwise. Services in the form of welfare are, after 
all, subject to accumulation. That there might be 
obstacles to welfare, service delivery, for the bulk 
of the population in the process of accumulation 
should be considered by those inclined to policy 
formulation.
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1 This Discussion Paper is an extended and revised 
version of a seminar presentation made in the SSGM 
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to Bill Standish and to Henry Ivarature who also 
provided information for the paper. Two anonymous 
referees also provided helpful comments which are 
appreciated.
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